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 Indigenous Justice and the Right 
to a Fair Trial 
 GISELLE  CORRADI 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 WHEN A STATE endorses legal pluralism and gives offi cial status to more than one legal order, it is often confronted with the task of guaranteeing that all these legal orders comply with human 
rights. This is frequently the case in postcolonial settings, where next to 
the legal institutions inherited from former colonial powers, indigenous or 
customary legal orders are also part of the state architecture for justice pro-
vision. As with all legal orders, indigenous law may advance human rights 
in certain areas, but undermine them in others. At the same time, these legal 
orders are embedded in historical, cultural and socioeconomic contexts that 
differ in several respects from those that gave rise to human rights law. 
For these reasons, evaluating whether indigenous law complies with human 
rights standards and taking measures for the protection of human rights in 
legally plural jurisdictions are not straightforward tasks. One issue that has 
been identifi ed as crucial in this respect is the way in which human rights 
are interpreted and whether such interpretation adopts a cross-cultural 
approach (An Na ’ Im 1992; Eberhard 2002; Sousa Santos 2002). This is 
one of the legacies of the well-known  ‘ universality debate ’ , which, amongst 
others, showed that human rights need to be understood in fl exible ways 
in order to respond to diverse realities and be seen as legitimate across dif-
ferent contexts (Brems 2001; Donelly 2007, 1984). In addition, compara-
tive legal scholars have demonstrated that indigenous and customary legal 
orders do not operate in the same way as the civil and common law tradi-
tions that lie at the basis of many state legal orders (Glenn 2000). In other 
words, one needs to take legal diversity into account. Therefore, assessing 
the relationship between indigenous legal orders and human rights requires 
understanding the context in which these legal orders operate as well as 
their logic, ie their underlying rationales, values, principles and ways of 
reasoning, which inform particular norms and practices (An-Na ’ Im 1992; 
Sanchez Botero 2004). 
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 1  Constitutional Court of Colombia, sentence T523 of 1997 
 2  ibid, introductory paragraph (my translation from Spanish). 
 3  ibid. 
 4  This case study is based on fi eldwork carried out in Bolivia in October 2012 and January –
 March 2013. In Curahuara de Carangas, 41 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
indigenous leaders, state justice providers, religious leaders, social workers and litigants. These 
interviews focused on the procedures followed within indigenous justice forums, the relation-
ship between these and other justice providers available in this town, and how such forms 
of articulation worked in practice in a number of cases. Four focus group discussions were 
organised (one with female litigants, two with youngsters aged between 15 and 16, and one 
with current indigenous authorities) about local perceptions of the different dispute-processing 
mechanisms available in Curahuara de Carangas. This was complemented by observations at 
two monthly meetings between indigenous and municipal authorities, and a desk-based litera-
ture review on Andean culture, indigenous justice and legal pluralism in Bolivia. In addition, 
27 semi-structured interviews were conducted in La Paz and Sucre with representatives from 
the government, civil society organisations, international organisations and local experts. These 
interviews dealt with the national legal framework regulating legal pluralism and  indigenous 
 This chapter examines how this applies to the right to a fair trial.  Previous 
cross-cultural studies on the right to a fair trial remark this right has been 
generally understood in a monocultural way, by implicit reference to legal 
orders of Western origin (D ’ Engelbronner-Kolff 2001; Padilla Rubiano 
2012; Sanchez Botero 2004). The case law of the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia can be said to constitute an exception. In determining whether the 
right to professional legal counsel applies to indigenous justice, the Court 
highlighted that this form of representation is alien to indigenous practices, 
and that in a plural society, respect for cultural diversity entails no such 
imposition. 1 The Court maintained that: 
 [Indigenous] judgments should be carried out in conformity with the norms and 
procedures of indigenous communities, taking into account the specifi cities of 
each sociopolitical form of organisation, as well as the characteristics of its legal 
order. 2 
 According to the Court,  ‘ [W]hat is required is the fulfi lment of those steps 
that the accused can foresee, and respect for those traditional practices that 
serve as the basis for social cohesion. ’ 3 However, the Court provides no 
guidance on how to evaluate the extent to which indigenous norms and 
procedures are compatible with fair-trial guarantees. In that regard, some 
authors argue that a few elements of this right ought to be respected by all 
legal orders, such as the possibility to defend oneself, the presumption of 
innocence, the impartiality of the judge, the legitimacy of the procedures 
and the possibility to appeal (Padilla Rubiano 2012: 92). 
 Based on a case study conducted in the Aymara indigenous municipal-
ity Curahuara de Carangas, in the Bolivian highlands, this chapter identi-
fi es a number of elements of the right to a fair trial that raise questions of 
interpretation when applied to disputing institutions such as those operating 
in this locality. 4 The chapter is divided into three sections. Following this 
introduction, the second section presents the backdrop of the case study. It 
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justice in Bolivia, as well as the controversies that surround it and how these issues relate to 
human rights. Insights on these topics were also gathered by participating in a three-day panel 
at the Congress of the Latin American Network of Legal Anthropologists in Sucre from 24 to 
26 October 2012, which counted an overwhelming presence of indigenous leaders who pre-
sented and debated their views on the subject. 
 5  According to the national census of 2001, 62 % of the population self-identifi ed as indig-
enous, whereas the census of 2012 shows a lower percentage of 41 % . According to both 
censuses, the biggest ethnic groups are the Aymara and the Quechua, which together represent 
about 90 % of the indigenous populations of Bolivia, living mainly in the highlands and the 
valleys. The remaining 34 indigenous groups inhabit the Bolivian lowlands. 
 6  Under Spanish colonial rule, a segregationist model was instituted in which  ‘ peninsulars ’ 
and  ‘ Indians ’ were governed by differentiated legal regimes. This allowed indigenous authori-
ties to administer justice amongst indigenous populations according to their practices and cus-
toms, but only in minor cases, while serious cases had to be handled by the Spanish authorities. 
Upon independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century,  criollo elites, following  ‘ civilis-
ing ’ discourses and the theory of legal monism, embraced an assimilationist model in which the 
entire population was subjected to a single body of law, the administration of which was the 
exclusive faculty of the judiciaries of the newly constituted states. By the mid twentieth century, 
concerns over the widespread poverty and marginalisation of indigenous populations led to the 
introduction of an integrationist model, in which indigenous institutions would be protected 
as long as these populations were not fully integrated into the life of the nation. This model, 
which framed the  ‘ Indian problem ’ in terms of class, saw indigenous culture as temporary and 
bound to disappear as socioeconomic measures would integrate these sectors of the population 
into modern life (Yrigoyen 2002). 
discusses the main characteristics of the justice landscapes in which disputes 
are  handled in Bolivia, including the accessibility of state and indigenous 
disputing forums and the relationship between these legal orders in law and 
practice. The third section zooms in on the case study. First, it describes the 
main features of the indigenous disputing institutions operating in Cura-
huara de Carangas. And second, it scrutinises the relationship between 
fair-trial standards and the procedures followed by these disputing forums. 
Finally, the conclusion refl ects on how areas of tension between the former 
and the latter may be addressed. 
 2. THE JUSTICE LANDSCAPES OF BOLIVIA 
 Bolivia constitutes an interesting context in which to examine the relation-
ship between human rights, indigenous law and legal pluralism for several 
reasons. First, indigenous legal orders play a signifi cant role in regulating 
social relations within indigenous groups, which constitute the majority 
of the population (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de Bolivia 
1999; Red Participacion y Justicia 2010; Santos Sousa and Exeni Rodri-
guez 2012). 5 Since the fi rst colonial encounters about fi ve hundred years 
ago and until recently, these groups and their institutions have been treated 
as inferior by colonial and postcolonial legal and political regimes, although 
the models that sustained this repression have changed over time. 6 Despite 
these policies, indigenous legal orders continued to operate at grass-roots 
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 7  The territory of Bolivia is divided into nine departments, which are further subdivided into 
provinces and municipalities. 
level, often in a clandestine way, perpetuating a situation of unoffi cial legal 
 pluralism. This can be partly explained by the legitimacy of these institu-
tions, and partly by the minimal presence of the judiciary throughout the 
national territory (Albo 2012; Yrigoyen 2002). 
 The forms of justice practised by these groups today vary, as has the way 
in which these practices evolved throughout history in response to contact 
with colonial and postcolonial state law (Albo 2012; Cottyn 2014). In most 
regions, they constitute the most accessible form of justice for indigenous 
populations, particularly in rural areas (IACHR 2007; IIDH 2006; Red Par-
ticipacion y Justicia 2010).  ‘ Ordinary justice ’ , as state justice is called in 
Bolivia, presents serious problems in terms of physical access, capacity and 
credibility due to the small budget allocated to the judicial branch (ibid). 
According to existing studies, state justice covers only 42 % of the territory 
and is unevenly distributed, extending mainly to urban areas, ie the capital 
cities of each department (Red Participacion y Justicia 2010). 7 In addition, 
it cannot muster suffi cient personnel to meet the needs of the population, 
which translates into serious case backlogs. Moreover, state justice has the 
reputation of being corrupt and discriminatory towards indigenous peoples 
(ibid). By contrast, indigenous legal orders operate at the most local levels 
of social organisation and involve extensive community participation 
 (Fernandez Osco 2000; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de 
Bolivia 1999; Santos Sousa and Exeni Rodriguez 2012). At the same time, 
these legal orders present their own challenges. For example, their effi cacy 
diminishes in the case of disputes that reach beyond the level of the com-
munity (Albo 2012). From a human rights perspective, these challenges also 
include reports that in some cases corporal punishments may be adminis-
tered, the fact that women are often discriminated against, and the exist-
ence of procedures that contravene fair trial guarantees (Coordinadora de la 
Mujer 2009; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos 1999). 
 A second reason why Bolivia constitutes an interesting setting for the pur-
poses of this study is that in recent years the country underwent a remark-
able shift in its policies towards indigenous legal orders. The history of 
denial, exploitation, discrimination and exclusion that until recently char-
acterised state – indigenous relationships generated profound distrust of the 
state among indigenous peoples, as well as demands for inclusion (Goodale 
2009). During the last decade of the twentieth century a number of fac-
tors converged, such as a return to democracy, the crisis in the legitimacy 
of state institutions, the organised mobilisation of indigenous peoples, and 
the development of international law and jurisprudence framing indigenous 
demands in terms of human rights. This led to the adoption of constitutional 
reforms throughout the region that recognised the multicultural composition 
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 8  Arts 27, 34 and 40 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and 
Arts 8(2) and 9(1) the ILO Convention 169. Bolivia ratifi ed ILO Convention 169 in 1991 by 
Law 1257 and incorporated the UNDRIP into national law on 7 November 2007. 
 9  The following issues fall outside the scope of indigenous justice: homicide or assassina-
tion, rape, violations of the integrity of children and adolescents, crimes against humanity, the 
traffi cking of human beings, arms or drugs, terrorism, corruption, trade and tariff law, crimes 
affecting the security of the state, issues related to forest and agrarian law, labour, social secu-
rity, tax, information, mining, hydrocarbons, and civil law issues in which the state is a party 
to the confl ict (Law 073 Art 10 [II]). 
 10  See Barrera (2011) for a detailed discussion of Law 073. 
of society, and, to varying degrees, indigenous law and legal pluralism 
(Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2002; Yrigoyen 2002). In the case of Bolivia, these 
transformations fi rst crystallised in the Constitution of 1994, which rec-
ognised the right to apply customary law in indigenous communities as an 
alternative form of justice, subject to the Constitution and the laws of the 
state (Article 171). But it was only with the adoption of the Constitution 
of 2009 that indigenous justice and legal pluralism were granted a more 
solid status. Bolivia ’ s current constitutional recognition of indigenous legal 
orders is actually among the few in the world to refl ect the standards that 
international human rights law establishes with regard to this matter. 8 The 
Bolivian Constitution grants indigenous communities the right to admin-
ister indigenous law according to their  ‘ cosmovision ’ (Political Constitu-
tion of the Bolivian State 2009, Article 30(14)), while it stipulates that state 
and indigenous law have the same hierarchy, and that both legal orders are 
expected to comply with human rights (Political Constitution of the Boliv-
ian State 2009, Article 179). 
 This new framework for the relationship between state and indigenous 
law generates unprecedented opportunities for indigenous communities to 
engage in processes of empowerment and reinvention. At the same time, 
it offers state and indigenous justice providers the possibility to see each 
other as peers, which could allow collaborative relationships to fl ourish. 
But this is far from automatic. According to Red Participacion y Justicia: 
 ‘ At present, the coordination and cooperation between ordinary and indig-
enous justice is generally inexistent ’ (Red Participacion y Justicia 2010: 68). 
Moreover, Law 073 on Jurisdictional Delimitation, which was adopted 
in 2010 in order to regulate the coexistence of state and indigenous legal 
orders, poses far-reaching limits on the competence of indigenous disputing 
forums. 9 Some of the issues that are excluded from their material jurisdic-
tion, such as agrarian and forest law, rape, homicide and assassination, and 
violations of the integrity of children and adolescents, have often been dealt 
with by indigenous communities, which opens the door for their criminali-
sation. 10 As this chapter argues, instead of imposing these top-down limits, 
which in practice are rarely enforced, it is the construction of horizontal 
relationships of trust between state and indigenous justice providers that 
is needed for the protection of human rights. Collaboration between these 
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 11  Whites and  mestizos are rare in Curahuara de Carangas because the region was never 
found economically attractive by these groups since there are no  haciendas nor mining activi-
ties in this area. 
 12  Aymara is the dominating ethnolinguistic group of the Bolivian Highlands. Its sociopoliti-
cal and territorial organisation rests on various layers of authority and group formation, which 
are linked to the control of land. The  ayllu groups a number of families and constitutes the 
basic unit of institutionalised community ties linked to a communal territory. This territory 
may be discontinuous and divided into different zones that are complementary in terms of 
ecological resources, including communal land that is allocated to a family ( saya ñ a ), and areas 
that are for the common use of a group of families ( saraqa ). A number of  ayllus form a  marka , 
which is the space of encounter at the village level. A  marka is divided into two complementary 
moieties  aransaya and  urinsaya . In the case of the Kurawara Marka, there are seven  ayllus in 
each of these moieties, totalling 14. A number of  markas in turn form a  suyu . The Kurawara 
Marka belongs to the  suyu Jach ’ a Carangas, which groups 12  markas . 
 13  About 10 % of the population according to the Plan de Desarrollo Municipal Originario 
2007 – 2011 (Municipal Government/Council of Indigenous Authorities 2007). 
 14  Around 95 % of the population of Curahuara live in poverty (Municipal Government and 
Council of Indigenous Authorities of Curahuara 2007). 
 15  The term  cargo refers to positions of leadership at the level of the  ayllu and the  marka . 
A number of interviewees reported that those community members who live in the city and 
return to the community for the period of one year to perform a  cargo often have diffi culties 
in administering indigenous justice, as they are less acquainted with the norms and practices 
of the community. 
actors, particularly at local levels, is key in the emergence of cross-cultural 
ways of interpreting human rights and enhancing their implementation at 
the grass roots. 
 3. THE CASE STUDY: CURAHUARA DE CARANGAS 
 Curahuara de Carangas is an indigenous rural municipality at the north-
west of the Oruro department, in the Bolivian highlands. 11 Its territory coin-
cides with the Aymara territorial and sociopolitical unit of organisation, the 
Kurawara Marka, which groups fourteen  ayllus . 12 There are a number of 
roads one may take to arrive in Curahuara, but when coming from Oruro, 
the nearest important city, it takes a trip of 4 – 6 hours (depending on the 
means of transport) on a zigzagging route across the seemingly desolated 
Andean high plateau, at about 4000 meters above sea level. But despite 
its remoteness, Curahuara is not isolated. Of its 6,000 inhabitants, only a 
minority reside in town permanently. 13 Most Curahuare ñ os spend their life 
between the town and their fi elds, where they herd camelids and sheep, in 
combination with cultivating subsistence crops. The low profi ts generated 
by these activities encourage most Curahuare ñ os to migrate temporarily to 
nearby regions, where they engage in seasonal work or commercial activi-
ties. 14 Lately, permanent migration to urban centres has been on the increase 
as a result of increasing poverty, although in many cases Curahuare ñ os keep 
their communal ties and rights to land by returning temporarily to take 
on the role of a  cargo and/or take part in the annual festivities (Municipal 
 Government/Council of Indigenous Authorities 2007). 15 
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 16  According to Rodas Arano (2013: 60), such internal and external forms of mobility have 
been part and parcel of  ‘ Curahuaran culture ’ for centuries. This is rooted in herding practices, 
which require and lead to mobility. However, such practices are currently under transforma-
tion with the introduction of development projects that aim at increasing the productivity of 
herding activities by introducing fences. This author argues that fences reduce mobility and 
change the perception of camelids and the territory (ibid). At another level, the capacity of 
the Curahuare ñ os to reproduce elements of Aymara culture while participating in the broader 
society is quite visible in language: Aymara is the fi rst language, followed by Spanish, with 80 % 
of the population being bilingual (Municipal Government and Council of Indigenous Authori-
ties of Curahuara 2007). Some indigenous leaders also reported that they had held positions of 
authority in state structures, eg as mayor, or responsible for the civil registry. 
 17  Indigenous and municipal authorities meet twice a month on Sunday to explain and dis-
cuss issues affecting Curahuara de Carangas in an open forum where everybody can partici-
pate. Moreover, the offi ce of the mayor and that of indigenous authorities are housed in the 
same building. 
 18  Rape was also mentioned as an offence that may be solved by indigenous authorities, 
although many interviewees explained that these cases are often transferred to the police. 
 This inner and outer mobility enable the reproduction of Aymara institu-
tions, while at the same time allowing for contact with state structures and 
the wider society. 16 The latter is also facilitated by the presence of a number 
of institutions representing the state at the local level. The town has three 
schools, a health post, the offi ce of the mayor, a civil registry, a court of fi rst 
instance, an environmental court, a police post, a military post and a local 
representation of the Ombudsman. In addition, there are two evangelical 
churches and a Catholic one. Moreover, Curahuara de Carangas has been 
awarded the title of  ‘ exemplary municipality ’ due to the high levels of artic-
ulation between state and indigenous authorities (Municipal Government 
2009). 17 As such, it constitutes an interesting site to study the relationship 
between different normative regimes. 
 The remainder of this chapter focuses on these relationships from two 
angles. First, it describes the procedures of indigenous disputing institutions 
in this locality and analyses how they relate to fair-trial standards, while 
refl ecting on aspects of this right that raise questions of interpretation in 
relation to these institutions. And second, it explores how different forms 
of interaction between state and indigenous justice providers may open and 
close spaces in which tension between human rights and indigenous law 
may be addressed in a cross-cultural manner. 
 3.1. Indigenous Disputing Institutions in Curahuara de Carangas 
 The most common types of dispute handled by indigenous justice in Cura-
huara de Carangas are confl icts over the delimitation of land plots, the tres-
passing of animals from one plot to another causing crop damage, theft, 
intra-familial and marital confl icts, and fi ghts among community members, 
which may include physical and domestic violence. 18 Although there is some 
variation in the practices followed by the different  ayllus of the Kurawara 
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 19  It was beyond the scope of the fi eldwork to gather detailed primary data on the extent to 
which  ‘ an Andean cosmology ’ informs different elements of these disputing practices. There 
is ample evidence in anthropological sources that several aspects of indigenous life in this 
region are underpinned by relationships of reciprocity with different forces of the cosmos. For 
example, Canessa explains that the relationship between  jaqis (indigenous people in Aymara) 
and the surrounding environment should be understood in terms of intimacy with an animated 
landscape (Cansessa 2012: 162). At the level of law and justice, Fernandez Osco argues that 
according to Aymara normativity, human actions have repercussions beyond the human world. 
For example, abortion is sanctioned because it affects the agricultural cycle (Fernandez Osco 
2000, 2009). Although I did not come across such statements in Curahuara de Carangas, inter-
viewees did emphasise the importance of symbolic rituals that accompany dispute-processing 
practices, refl ecting the interconnection among community members and the  pachamama 
(earth goddess). 
 20  The  padrinos are the godparents of a couple, who are expected to give guidance and 
council, particularly at diffi cult times. 
 21  The term  awatiri can be translated as  ‘ shepherd ’ , and in fact, the  awatiri is expected to 
perform the function of guiding the members of the  ayllu as a shepherd would guide his sheep, 
or as an  ‘ eldest brother ’ who takes care of the wellbeing of the community. The terms  tamani 
and  jillakata are also used to refer to this position. The terms  sullka awatiri and  sullka tamani 
could be translated as  ‘ young brother ’ . In practice, the  sullka acts as an assistant of the  awatiri 
in a certain zone of the  ayllu , but has no political authority. 
 22  In general, if the  sullka has a stake in the confl ict, or if the parties simply do not consider 
him fi t to deal with it, a case will be brought directly to the  awatiri . 
 23  Although in some circumstances, a non-married person may be chosen too. In addition, 
the role of men and women is not equal. The latter rarely take a leading role in public decision 
making (Flores Condori 2012; Gadea 2010) 
Marka, the following elements can be said to constitute a common core of 
the dispute process. 19 
 In general, the aggrieved party presents her complaint to the authorities of 
the  ayllu , although in the case of marital confl icts, the relatives and  padrinos 
of the couple tend to be approached fi rst. 20 An  ayllu may be divided into 
several zones and the aggrieved party normally brings the case fi rst to the 
authority of her zone, the  sullka . However, in some cases, she may approach 
directly the main authority of the  ayllu , the  awatiri . 21 There are no strict 
rules concerning this and the procedures followed at both levels are basi-
cally the same, but even if the parties fi rst tried to solve the case with the 
 sullka without success, the case can still be transferred to the  awatiri . 22 
 These positions of communal leadership are characterised by a number 
of principles, such as  chacha warmi , service to the community,  thaki , rota-
tion and consensus, which infl uence the way in which indigenous authori-
ties exercise jurisdictional functions (Flores Condori 2012: 39).  Chacha 
warmi refers to the man – woman complementarity that exists in a couple, 
and in general, it is married couples that are elected to perform a position 
of leadership together. 23 Appointment to such positions is considered a duty 
and a service to the community, which is related to the concept of  thaki or 
 ‘ movement along a path ’ (Canessa 2012). Every adult member of the  ayllu 
is expected to follow this path, in which life experience, knowledge and 
maturity are accumulated, eg as  sullka , later as  awatiri and eventually as 
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 24  The  mallkus are the indigenous authorities at the level of the  marka . 
 25  Although there is a certain fl exibility, typical requirements to become an authority are to 
be married, to work the land and make contributions to the  ayllu , to have had fulfi lled other 
positions of authority, to have reached a certain age (which varies depending on the function), 
and to reside in the community for the duration of the function. 
 26  The Spanish word used by the interviewees was  audiencia , which is the same word used 
by state justice to refer to a hearing. If one of the parties is not present, the hearing is postponed. 
 27  For example, the relatively recent introduction of fences in the context of herding activi-
ties has led to disputes in which indigenous practices regarding communal uses of land are 
questioned (Rodas Arano 2013). 
 28  The  awatiris offi ciate their hearings in front of the the  ‘ Re-Patron and the Re-Maria ’ , 
whereas the  mallkus do it in front of the  Santa Wara , a stick symbolizing ruling power. 
 mallku . 24 As a result, authority is rotational, implying high levels of down-
wards accountability. On their fi rst day as authorities on 1 January, the 
 awatiris and the  sullkas are expected to visit each family and get acquainted 
with the  ‘ state ’ of their  ayllu , which they will lead for one year. In the case 
of the  awatiris , their responsibilities entail both judicial and political func-
tions, such as chairing  ayllu assemblies, coordinating (and often sponsor-
ing) the organisation of yearly rituals and festivities, the governance of land 
and other community resources, as well as the settlement of disputes. The 
decision-making processes involved in these activities are characterised by 
dialogue and seeking consensus. Authorities are elected democratically by 
the members of the  ayllu , and are expected to capture and give expression 
to the common will. 25 
 After receiving a complaint, the  awatiri or the  sullka fi x a date on which 
both parties can attend a  ‘ hearing ’ . 26 The aim of such hearings is to arrive at 
a decision that both sides fi nd acceptable, even if only temporarily, so that 
they can continue to live side by side, avoiding the disruption of community 
activities. It is the responsibility of the  awatiri or the  sullka to understand 
the origins of the confl ict, in order to be able to facilitate a consensual agree-
ment. Moreover, if one or both parties are found to be  ‘ at fault ’ , the  sullka 
or the  awatiri need to make the person(s) understand what was wrong 
and why, regret it and apologise. In other words, indigenous authorities 
are expected to correct bad behaviour. This may extend beyond the indi-
vidual who committed the fault. For example, the blame may also fall upon 
relatives who failed to guide a person into following the right conduct. The 
body of norms that infl uence such appraisals is oral and of general knowl-
edge amongst community members, although these norms may be contested 
at some point. 27 
 A typical hearing starts with a series of rituals that symbolise the inter-
connectedness among community members and the  pachamama (earth god-
dess), such as sharing coca leaves and a drink (often alcohol), and rituals of 
libation called  ch ’ allas . After reminding the parties that they should speak 
the truth since they are in front of holy symbols, the authorities listen to both 
sides. 28 The parties are normally accompanied by witnesses, who present 
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 29  According to Gadea, imprisonment in the local cell for a couple of days is a common 
form of punishment in cases involving physical violence, including domestic violence (Gadea 
2010: 72). 
 30  Several interviewees reported that  actas serve as a means of proof of what was agreed in 
case the confl ict should resurface in the future. Contrary to the practice of state courts, these 
documents were not reported to function as a precedent of how certain types of case should 
be dealt with. 
 31  None of the interviewees reported the use of supernatural forms of proof at these hear-
ings, such as the reading of coca leaves. Legal anthropologists working in other Aymara regions 
found this practice to be quite frequent (Fernandez 2000). A few interviewees mentioned this 
practice in the context of health-related issues for which a traditional doctor is consulted in 
order to determine the origin of a disease, although it cannot be excluded that this may be 
associated to witchcraft accusations leading to disputes. 
their testimonies too. On this basis, the authority makes an analysis of the 
case and proposes how it should be settled. This leads to further discussions, 
after which an agreement may be fi nally negotiated. A sanction or compen-
sation may be in order when the damage caused is considered signifi cant, or 
in cases of recidivism. But the authority may simply call the attention of the 
person in fault, should he consider that this may suffi ce to correct the devi-
ant behaviour. In most cases, sanctions and forms of compensation entail 
manual work (for the community or the aggrieved party) such as making a 
certain number of adobe bricks, the restitution of stolen goods and/or the 
payment of a fi ne. 29 This is negotiated case by case, based on the discre-
tion of the authority about what is appropriate, and what is acceptable 
to the parties involved. Agreements are sealed by sharing a drink, which 
symbolises the re-establishment of normal relationships. In some cases, the 
agreement is written down in a document called an  acta , although not all 
authorities follow this practice consistently. 30 In principle, compliance with 
these decisions relies on the voluntary will of the parties. But otherwise, 
social pressure may serve as a form of coercion, particularly when corporate 
interests are at stake. 
 If the authorities consider that the evidence presented at a hearing is not 
suffi cient to understand the facts of a case, they undertake an investigation, 
for example, by visiting the disputed terrain or the place in which a robbery 
took place, following footsteps, interrogating other witnesses or looking for 
documents. When no material forms of proof are available, a  juramento 
may be taken, ie swearing about one ’ s innocence in front of a holy symbol. 
If the person who swears is lying, it is believed that she/he or his/her fam-
ily will undergo a calamity, and even death. 31 As a result, depending on 
the circumstances, handling a case may involve several steps and hearings. 
Moreover, some cases may be transferred to a state instance, either as a form 
of appeal by an unsatisfi ed party, or as a form of referral when indigenous 
authorities consider that it is beyond the capacity of indigenous institutions 
to deal with a certain case. Nevertheless, the timeframe in which disputes 
are handled by indigenous justice tends to be relatively short, as it is consid-
ered important to avoid the escalation of confl icts. 
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 32  It is not so much the substance of a case that determines whether it needs to be treated by 
the general assembly, but a balance between the stakes of the community and the interests and 
bargaining power of the parties involved. For example, an offence such as adultery may or not 
be treated by the general assembly depending on these factors. 
 33  The former deals with the internal affairs of the  marka , whereas the latter is responsible 
for the external relationships. 
 34  Kharisiri ,  kharikhari ,  lik ’ ichiri and  khariri are the terms used in the Andean world to refer 
to a person that steals the fat of another one, causing his illness and death. A  kharisiri can be 
a man or a woman. He or she will provoke an irresistible tiredness in his victim, normally a 
lonely traveller. When asleep, the  kharisiri will use a device (which can be a syringe or a  ‘ small 
machine ’ ) to extract the fat that surrounds the right kidney of his victim, which is supposed to 
 Certain confl icts may require the involvement of other levels of indig-
enous authority. For example, cases that involve several families or that 
are considered to affect the entire community are brought for discussion 
at the general assembly of the  ayllu . This consists of a monthly meeting, in 
which community members discuss the issues affecting the  ayllu , although 
in urgent situations an ad hoc assembly may be summoned too. 32 In these 
meetings, the testimonies of the parties and witnesses, as well as any element 
of proof that is available, are considered by the assembly, after which an 
open debate is facilitated by the  awatiri . Taken on the basis of consensus, 
the decisions of the assembly are mandatory. If an assembly comes to the 
conclusion that there is no way to correct someone ’ s bad behaviour, and 
hence, that the restoration of normal relationships is impossible, a person 
may be sanctioned by banishment from the community. This goes hand in 
hand with the loss of communal land rights. The decisions of the assembly 
are enforced by means of social pressure, which may turn into physical vio-
lence in case of non-compliance. The accused may contest such decisions, 
either by involving higher levels of indigenous authority, or by recourse 
to state authorities. Nevertheless, in general, he/she and often also other 
members of the family have no choice but to leave the  ayllu for reasons of 
personal safety. Meanwhile, they may stay at their residence in the village, 
and so remain within the  marka , the socioterritorial unit comprising the 
fourteen  ayllus of Kurawara. 
 Confl icts that involve more than one  ayllu are handled by the  mallkus , the 
indigenous authorities at the level of the  marka . The procedures followed 
by the  mallkus are basically the same as those followed by the  ayllu authori-
ties. The  marka has two  mallkus , the  mallku de marka and the  mallku de 
consejo , representing the two moieties of the  marka ,  aransaya and  urinsaya , 
for which they alternate yearly. 33 The  mallkus receive cases from the  ayl-
lus that correspond to their partiality, but occasionally, the two  mallkus 
need to handle a case together, for example when it involves  ayllus from the 
two partialities. From time to time, indigenous authorities are confronted 
with more  ‘ diffi cult ’ cases that require the involvement of both  mallkus and 
the  awatiris , such as illegal traffi cking or the appearance of a  kharisiri . 34 
In very exceptional circumstances, the  mallkus may call a  cabildo , 
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be of high value for magical purposes. When the victim wakes up, he cannot remember any-
thing but feels very weak. As time passes, he gets worse, with vomits, fever, etc, until he dies. In 
the past, the fi gure of the  kharisiri was associated with outsiders, such as priests and foreigners, 
but nowadays, it can be anyone, particularly persons that do not conform to communal norms 
and duties (Fernandez Juares 2008; Riviere 1991). 
 35  In international law, the right to a fair trial is established by Arts 14 and 15 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966); Arts 6 and 7 European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, 1950); Arts 2 and 4 
Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Protocol 7 ECHR); Arts 8 and 9 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, 
1969); Arts 7 and 26 African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights (Banjul Charter, 1981); 
and Art 40 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). It is also included in Arts 10 and 11 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and Arts 47 – 50 Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights of the European Union (2000). 
ie an ad hoc meeting of the members of the  marka to treat diffi cult cases in 
an open assembly. 
 The next section explores the relationship between these forums ’ proce-
dures and fair-trial standards. The analysis is concerned with the norma-
tivity surrounding these procedures, rather than with these forums ’ actual 
practices. Practices may of course deviate from existing norms. As explained 
in the introduction to this chapter, the point made by the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia in its judgement 523/1997 is precisely that the practices 
of indigenous disputing institutions should be appraised against indigenous 
rather than state procedural law. The discussion is based on recurrent nor-
mative discourses collected in the course of the fi eldwork about which pro-
cedures should be followed by indigenous disputing forums and why. But 
the normativity surrounding these procedures is not necessarily explicit, let 
alone written. The characterisation  ‘ indigenous procedural norms ’ refers to 
the fact that these norms are applicable in indigenous disputing forums, 
without entailing that there is anything intrinsically indigenous about them. 
Some of these procedures may have been inspired by aspects of state proce-
dural law. Similarly, the label  ‘ indigenous ’ neither implies that the discourses 
collected are totally homogenous, nor that everybody in this region agrees 
with them. The aim of the analysis is twofold: to assess the relationship 
between the procedural norms at play in the indigenous disputing forums of 
Curahuara de Carangas and international standards, and to refl ect on how 
the latter may need to be interpreted in the context of this examination. 
 3.2.  Exploring the Relationship between International Fair Trial 
Standards and Indigenous Procedural Norms 
 The right to a fair trial is a composite right with several dimensions, includ-
ing issues of access to justice as well as requirements imposed upon decision-
making bodies and their procedures. 35 These requirements guarantee that 
decision-making processes resulting in a binding verdict on someone ’ s guilt 
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and punishment or on someone ’ s duties and entitlements are made without 
arbitrariness or abuses of power. In order to achieve these goals, two issues 
are paramount: the equality of the parties and the objectivity of the deci-
sion-maker (Shah 2010; Tapia Pinto 2008). Both elements are interlinked: 
the fairness of the process entails that the decision-maker is a third party, 
who can objectively assess and balance the arguments and stakes of two 
parties that stand equally before him. For this purpose, certain requisites 
are imposed upon the decision-maker, ie he needs to be independent, impar-
tial and competent. Independency refers to the judge or tribunal being free 
from external pressures, intimidation and confl icts of interest affecting its 
decision-making capacities. This entails clear procedures and criteria for the 
appointment and removal of judges, as well as respect for the principle of 
separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Impartiality means 
that the judge has no personal bias or interests that may interfere with his 
appraisal of the case at hand (subjective impartiality). The judge or tribunal 
must not only be impartial, but also appear so to a reasonable observer 
(objective impartiality). Finally, his capacity to hear a case needs to be estab-
lished in advance by law (competent judge). The requirement of equality 
between the disputing parties means that all individuals ought to have an 
equal chance to pursue their rights in court (equal access), that all parties 
are provided with the same opportunities to challenge all the arguments 
put forward by the other side (equality of arms), and that there is no differ-
ential treatment of persons during court proceedings (non-discrimination). 
In addition, a fair hearing presupposes real and effective access to a court, 
that hearings are held within a reasonable time, that applicants have a real 
opportunity to present their case or challenge the case against them, that 
judgments are (made) public, except in circumstances that justify otherwise, 
and that courts or tribunals provide reasons for their judgments. 
 Furthermore, the right to a fair trial encompasses a series of guarantees 
of due process applicable to criminal proceedings. These include the rights 
to be informed promptly and in detail of the charge, to defend oneself, and 
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, to 
communicate with legal counsel of one ’ s own choice, to examine witnesses 
and present evidence, and to be tried in person, without undue delay, and 
all of this in a language understood by the defendant. The accused also 
has the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or plead guilty, 
whereas any evidence obtained by coercive means is unacceptable. He also 
has the right to be presumed innocent, and be declared innocent in case of 
insuffi cient proof of guilt ( in dubio pro reo ). He cannot be charged twice 
for the same offence ( ne bis in idem ), or held guilty on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time when it 
was committed ( nullem crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia ). In a similar 
vein, the penalties imposed cannot be heavier than what was applicable 
when the offence was committed, or collective. Finally, everyone convicted 
110  Giselle Corradi
 36  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32 on the Right to Equality before the 
Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007). See also Burgorgue-
Larsen et al (2011: 659), Medina (2014), Shah (2010) and Tapia Pinto (2008). 
 37  See Medina (2014: 191). 
 38  ibid. 
 39  During the fi eldwork, no complaints were registered about this feature of indigenous 
justice institutions. 
of a crime has the right to appeal to a higher tribunal according to law, and 
be compensated in certain cases of miscarriage of justice. 36 
 Bolivia has ratifi ed a number of human rights treaties that enshrine these 
standards, such as the American Convention on Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In this context, a fi rst 
question is whether indigenous disputing institutions constitute  ‘ tribunals ’ 
according to international law. A positive answer to this question has two 
implications. First, that they satisfy the right to access to a court, and sec-
ond, that international standards of fair trial apply to them. The Human 
Rights Committee defi nes a tribunal as  ‘ a body, regardless of its denomina-
tion, that is established by law, is independent of the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government or enjoys in specifi c cases judicial independence 
in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature ’ . The 
Inter-American Court endorses a functional defi nition of a  ‘ tribunal ’ based 
on its capacity to make decisive rulings that affect the rights of persons. 37 
The indigenous disputing forums operating in Bolivia seem to meet these 
requirements, although the principle of separation of powers can be said to 
have an external and an internal dimension. The external dimension refers 
to whether these institutions are independent vis- à -vis the national execu-
tive and legislative branches of government, whereas the internal dimension 
relates to the separation of powers within indigenous structures of govern-
ance. In the case studied here, the jurisdictional functions of indigenous 
authorities are separated from state branches of government, but they are 
part of an overarching mandate to look after the collective wellbeing of 
the community, including the daily management of communal affairs. This 
comes down to no separation from (internal) executive powers. However, 
this does not entail a violation of the principle of independency per se. 
According to the Human Rights Committee, a tribunal should be independ-
ent of the executive and legislative powers,  ‘ or enjoy in specifi c cases judicial 
independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in 
nature ’ . 38 In Curahuara de Carangas, indigenous norms allow the same per-
son to embody executive and judicial tasks. It is questionable whether this 
constitutes an impediment to the exercise of judicial functions in a manner 
that is free from external pressure and confl icts of interest. As a result, some 
may contest whether these institutions satisfy the right to access a court 
according to international law. 39 
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 40  However, the Committee does not specify what these  ‘ basic ’ requirements are. General 
Comment on the Right to Equality before the Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007). 
 41  Arts 115, 116, 117, 119, 120 and 121 Political Constitution of 2009. 
 As regards the applicability of fair-trial standards to these institutions a 
positive answer is in order. Although the indigenous disputing forums dis-
cussed here do not always determine the outcome of a case, they have the 
capacity to make decisive rulings affecting the rights of persons. As explained 
before, indigenous authorities are in the fi rst place tasked with facilitating 
an outcome that is agreed upon by the litigants. It is when no consensus is 
reached and/or when there is a signifi cant communal stake that a  ‘ ruling ’ 
is imposed by indigenous authorities or the assembly. In any case, insofar 
as indigenous disputing institutions make or uphold enforceable decisions 
about entitlements, duties and sanctions, it is pertinent to ensure that the 
processes in which these decisions are made are not arbitrary or allow for 
abuses of power. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee, in its General 
Comment 32, holds that Article 14 of the ICCPR (on the right to a fair trial) 
applies where a state recognises courts based on customary law, which are 
expected to meet  ‘ basic requirements of fair trial ’ . 40 Finally, the right to a 
fair trial is guaranteed by several articles of Bolivia ’ s Political Constitution, 
which are applicable to indigenous justice. 41 That said, it is necessary to 
consider how the context and logic in which these disputing institutions are 
embedded affect the interpretation of the different elements of this right. 
 Fair-trial standards are crafted upon an adjudicative model of justice, in 
which a third party determines someone ’ s guilt and punishment, or balances 
the rights and obligations of two parties in a dyadic relationship. This entails 
similarities, but also differences, as compared to the disputing institutions 
discussed here. In particular, differences in the aim of the disputing process 
and the role of third parties therein seem to have implications in terms of the 
interpretation of certain elements of this right. In Curahuara de Carangas, 
the aim of indigenous dispute processes is to ensure the reproduction of 
communal life by restoring broken relationships, which entails addressing 
the root causes of the confl ict and correcting deviant behaviour. In certain 
cases, this is impossible, which results in decisions to remove the (f)actor(s) 
that are perceived to disrupt a certain communal order. In other words, 
the outcome of these processes is considered to affect not only the litigants 
but, explicitly or implicitly, also corporate interests. Therefore, within their 
jurisdictional functions, indigenous authorities are expected to protect the 
collective wellbeing. This is also the aim of decisions made within general 
assemblies. 
 Against this backdrop, a fi rst aspect of the right to a fair trial that needs to 
be reconsidered is the requirement of impartiality of the judge. In contexts 
of close community ties, it seems probable that third parties intervening in 
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a case (either the indigenous authorities or the communal assembly) have 
prior knowledge of the litigants and the confl ict. In those cases in which 
the role of these actors is to mediate a solution amongst the litigants, prior 
knowledge may facilitate this and may not necessarily mean a breach of this 
standard. That said, the requirement of subjective and objective impartiality 
seems to be part of indigenous procedural norms in the sense that indig-
enous authorities are expected not to let private personal stakes or opinions 
favour one party over the other. As a matter of fact, when an indigenous 
authority is too close to either party, he is not considered the right person 
to handle a case, which may determine whether the  sullka or the  awatiri 
should do so. However, this aspect of the right to a fair trial is not endorsed 
when it is the communal assembly that decides a case. Disconformities with 
the performance of indigenous authorities may be the subject of discussion 
at communal assemblies. Therefore, even if not all disputes are (made) pub-
lic, the possibility of public scrutiny is a relevant means of accountability 
within indigenous normativity. 
 Regarding the competence of the judge, the requirements that the capac-
ity of the decision-maker to hear a case is established in advance by law, 
and that there are clear procedures and criteria for his appointment and 
removal, are also part of indigenous law. This is refl ected by the existence 
of rules stipulating the role of different layers of indigenous authority and 
the communal assembly. However, it is necessary to question which law is 
given precedence in establishing who is a competent judge in Bolivia. State 
and indigenous legal orders are often at odds regarding what falls within the 
jurisdiction of indigenous justice. Since both legal orders may be mobilised 
by indigenous and non-indigenous litigants as well as indigenous and state 
justice providers to legitimate or undermine claims to authority, this aspect 
of the right to a fair trial may be quite instrumental in the contestation 
of power relationships between dominant and subaltern groups, but also 
within indigenous communities. As a result, it may be problematic to take 
either legal order as the point of departure for assessing compliance with 
this standard without understanding the interests and power dynamics at 
play in each particular case. 
 Regarding standards of equality between the disputing parties, factors 
such as the social capital of a litigant and gender ideologies infl uence to a 
large extent whether endorsing a certain decision is perceived to serve the 
collective wellbeing or not. Even if all community members are entitled to 
resort to an indigenous authority when they have a grievance, and have the 
same opportunities to present arguments and challenge those of the coun-
terparty in a hearing, equal treatment  ‘ in court ’ is infl uenced by the posi-
tion of the litigants within a web of relationships, connected to individual 
and collective interests. This may result in different forms of procedural 
discrimination. For example, cases that are similar in substance may be 
appraised differently, or enjoy different levels of community support for 
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 42  Admittedly, disagreements may arise as to what is proportional since the same conduct 
may be valued differently throughout time. Disagreements about proportionality may also 
exist within and across different segments of society. The refl ections presented in the conclusion 
would apply to such situations. 
enforcement purposes. As demonstrated by anthropological research on dis-
puting processes, mediation and negotiation require conditions of relatively 
equal power between the disputing parties (Nader and Todd 1978). This is 
not necessarily so in all cases handled by indigenous justice, which may lead 
to differential treatment due to power asymmetries amongst community 
members. Yet considering the origins of such unequal treatment, it seems 
unlikely that procedural standards alone constitute an effi cient remedy to 
counter these forms of discrimination. 
 With regard to guarantees of due process, several standards set by inter-
national law seem to be part of the indigenous normativity examined here. 
For example, the accused is informed of the charge and has the opportunity 
to defend himself, present witnesses and evidence. He is tried in person, 
without undue delay and in a language that he understands. He cannot be 
charged twice for the same offence, or held guilty for an act or omission 
which was not considered an offence when it was committed. Regarding 
the principle  nullum poena sine lege , the disputing institutions discussed 
here endorse sanctions and forms of compensation on the basis of what is 
negotiated as a  ‘ solution ’ in each case. Although the exact scope and form 
of sanction or compensation may fl uctuate from case to case, these institu-
tions seem to endorse this requirement as they resort to a range of (mostly 
orally defi ned) possible measures to deal with a certain offence. In addition, 
these institutions seem to be concerned with the proportionality between the 
severity of a sanction and a certain misconduct. 42 Finally, the accused also 
has the possibility to appeal, which can be done by resorting to another level 
of indigenous authority or to state justice. Other standards of due process 
seem less adapted to this context. A case in point is the right to communi-
cate with legal counsel. Since the disputing process does not involve spe-
cialised knowledge, litigants normally have the skills to defend themselves. 
 Furthermore, certain guarantees of due process are endorsed by indig-
enous law in some cases, but not always — for instance, whether an accused 
should be afforded time and means to prepare his defence, or be presumed 
innocent. This is the case when there are mutual accusations between com-
munity members, leading to an investigation about the responsibility of 
each party by indigenous authorities. However, in cases in which most com-
munity members are convinced of someone ’ s misbehaviour, these guaran-
tees do not exist. In such cases, it is considered that giving the accused time 
or means to prepare his defence may be counterproductive. First, since it is 
deemed of utmost importance to treat such cases in an assembly as soon as 
possible. And second, because this would allow the defendant to think of 
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excuses, which could lead to impunity. Despite these rationales, it remains a 
moot point whether disregard for these guarantees opens the door for arbi-
trary decisions. In addition, in such cases, coercive means may be justifi ed 
in order to extract a confession, and it may be considered legitimate that the 
sanctions imposed also affect the family of the accused, particularly in cases 
that are sanctioned by banishment from the community. Finally, some of the 
decisions made by indigenous disputing forums are based on evidence that 
requires bridging different ontological and epistemological frameworks —
 for instance, the use of  juramentos or the imposition of sanctions related to 
the crimes committed by  kharisiris . From a  ‘ Western ’ perspective, reliance 
on these forms of proof may be considered inconclusive, leading to breaches 
of fair trial guarantees such as  in dubio pro reo . These may be seen as the 
main areas of tension between indigenous procedural norms and fair-trial 
standards. 
 On the whole, the relationship between the normative bodies examined 
here is multifaceted. On the one hand, certain elements of this right seem 
to require a fl exible interpretation. On the other hand, there are areas of 
overlap and of tension. So how should these gaps between indigenous law 
and human rights be addressed ? This chapter rests on the premise that such 
endeavours require attention to the history of oppression of indigenous peo-
ples. This history makes it problematic to assume that these gaps can be 
simply declared a violation of human rights from a Western locus of enun-
ciation. This would amount to reproducing the power asymmetries that 
have characterised the relationship between dominant and subaltern forms 
of knowledge since the colonial encounter. Therefore, in contexts of offi cial 
legal pluralism, state policies, legislation and case law need to facilitate the 
emergence of spaces in which various normative and epistemological frame-
works can be combined to inform dialogues around these issues, leading to 
the interpretation and protection of human rights in an inter-legal and cross-
cultural manner. It is to this point that the conclusion turns. 
 4. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter started from the concern that in contexts of offi cial legal plural-
ism, such as Bolivia, human rights law imposes a duty on the state to ensure 
that indigenous legal orders meet international standards. This entails the 
delicate tasks of evaluating compliance and protecting human rights in a 
cross-cultural manner, while taking measures for the fulfi lment of human 
rights by different legal orders. The material presented here illustrates the 
complexities involved with regard to the right to a fair trial. The analysis 
demonstrates that different forms of social organisation and modes of dis-
pute-processing infl uence how arbitrariness and abuses of power may mani-
fest at the procedural level, and hence, which standards may be applicable 
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 43  Inksater (2010) uses the concept  ‘ transformative juri-cultural pluralism ’ to group the 
dimensions  ‘ inter-legal ’ and  ‘ cross-cultural ’ in human rights dialogue. 
to prevent this. The case study on indigenous disputing institutions in Cura-
huara de Carangas shows that factors such as the aim of the disputing pro-
cess and the role of third parties therein interplay with the relevance and 
appropriate interpretation of certain elements of this right in different dis-
puting contexts. At the same time, the chapter identifi ed a few areas of over-
lap and of tension between indigenous and human rights law. This raised 
the question as to how these gaps may be addressed. 
 Although answering this question deserves more than the few lines avail-
able for a concluding section, two issues are key. First, the actors and reg-
isters of law that are involved, and second, the power relations in which 
such processes are embedded. In contexts of offi cial legal pluralism, it 
seems fair to expect that states take measures to enable these areas of ten-
sion to be dealt with by means of inter-legal and cross-cultural dialogues 
 (Inksater 2010). 43 As explained in the introduction of this edited collection, 
legal pluralism is conducive to  ‘ inter-legality ’ (Santos 1987). Exposure to 
various normative repertoires, disputing institutions, authority regimes and 
societal models in general, contributes to the mixture and interpenetration 
of elements from different legal orders in people ’ s minds and actions. This 
precludes an essentialist understanding of the relationship between  ‘ a legal 
order ’ and  ‘ a people ’ , while it directs our attention to the processes in which 
contact with various normative models interplays with the development of 
inter-legal legal subjectivities. The spaces in which these mixed subjectivities 
take shape may constitute privileged sites for dialogues on human rights. 
 However, which measures may facilitate this ? Which actors should par-
ticipate and in which spaces can such dialogues take place ? Although not 
exclusively, disputing processes open considerable opportunities for this 
since a multiplicity of actors may contribute by bringing up different under-
standings of the relationship between indigenous norms and practices and 
human rights in concrete situations. In such cases, areas of tension between 
indigenous legal orders and human rights could be addressed by  ‘ mixed 
tribunals ’ in which authorities representing different legal orders handle 
cases together (Yrigoyen 1999). On the one hand, this could prevent human 
rights being understood according to a dominant perspective, and on the 
other, it could facilitate dissident voices to question indigenous norms and 
practices in a way that neither alienates critiques from an indigenous space, 
nor allows for communal silencing. 
 In Bolivia, the  ‘ Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal ’ is supposed to rep-
resent a mixed tribunal, as it is composed by seven judges of which at least 
two are of indigenous origin. However, constitutional judges need to have a 
law degree and at least eight years of specialisation in the fi eld of constitu-
tional law, administrative law or human rights, while having exercised the 
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function of indigenous authority is only considered as an asset (Law on the 
Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal, Article 17). As a result, it is debat-
able whether this tribunal can be seen as truly inter-legal and cross-cultural. 
Moreover, only a few disputes may fi nd their way up to this level. Therefore, 
this chapter argues that mixed disputing forums should also be foreseen at 
lower jurisdictional levels, and in particular at the grass roots, where more 
communal involvement is possible. Such collaborative spaces of joint action 
need not be permanent, but could be activated when there is a need for 
it — for example, whenever a litigant claims that indigenous justice does not 
respect his or her human rights, or when there is a claim that state justice is 
not responsive to the understanding that an indigenous community has of 
a certain case in which human rights are at stake. At present, Law 073 on 
Jurisdictional Delimitation only establishes that state and indigenous justice 
will coordinate and cooperate with each other, and lists a series of broadly 
defi ned mechanisms to this end, such as exchanging information and creat-
ing spaces for dialogue (Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16). Although this law does 
not prohibit spontaneous forms of collaboration between state and indig-
enous justice providers, its rhetoric seems to assume two separate spheres of 
dispute-processing, and it certainly does not require joint decision-making. 
 The proposal advanced here requires egalitarian relationships of trust 
between state and indigenous authorities. This is certainly a challenge that 
goes hand in hand with undoing histories of domination. While in some 
cases, these horizontal relationships have emerged spontaneously, due to 
daily contact, mutual knowledge and/or the perception that it is in the inter-
est of both parties to collaborate, certain structural factors may undermine 
them. For example, legislation and case law that limit the jurisdiction of 
indigenous justice unilaterally and against the practices of indigenous com-
munities, while rendering them vulnerable to criminalisation, are likely to 
form a signifi cant constraint. It is undeniable that constitutional provisions 
that recognise state and indigenous law on equal footing represent powerful 
tools to challenge such persistent asymmetries. At the same time, they open 
windows of opportunity for the materialisation of intra-community and 
cross-cultural dialogues on human rights, both in disputing and in non- 
disputing situations. But despite these advances, more sustained institu-
tional and personal efforts will be necessary in order to alter deeply rooted 
patterns of sub-alternisation. 
 
 
